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Studies of the categorical perception (CP) of sensory
continua have a long and rich history. For a comprehensive
review up until a decade ago, see the volume edited by
Harnad (1987). An important question concerns the pre-
cise definition of CP. According to the seminal contribu-
tion of Macmillan, Kaplan, and Creelman (1977), “the
relation between an observer’s ability to identify stimuli
along a continuum and his ability to discriminate be-
tween pairs of stimuli drawn from that continuum is a
classic problem in psychophysics” (p.452). The extent to
which discrimination is predictable from identification
performance has long been considered the acid test of
categorical—as opposed to continuous—perception.
Continuous perception is often characterized by (ap-
proximate) adherence to Weber’s law, according to which
the difference limen is a constant fraction of stimulus
magnitude. Also, discrimination is much better than
identification:1 Observers can make only a small number
of identifications along a single dimension, but they can
make relative (e.g., pairwise) discriminations between a
much larger number of stimuli (G. A. Miller, 1956). By
contrast, CP was originally defined (e.g., Liberman,
Cooper, Shankweiler, & Studdert-Kennedy, 1967; Liber-
man, Harris, Hoffman, & Griffith, 1957) as occurring
when the grain of discriminability coincided with (and
was, hence, predictable from) identification grain (i.e.,
when subjects could only discriminate between identifi-
able categories, not withinthem). Consequently, in CP, the
discrimination of equally separated stimulus pairs as a
function of stimulus magnitude is nonmonotonic, peaking
at a category boundary (Wood, 1976) defined as a 50%
point on a sharply rising or falling psychometric labeling
function.
In fact, there are degrees of CP. The strongest case, in
which identification grain would be equal to discrimina-
tion grain, would mean that observers could only discrim-
inate what they could identify: One just-noticeable dif-
ference would be the size of the whole category. This
(strongest) criterion has neverbeen met empirically: It has
always been possible to discriminate within the category,
and not just between. In his 1984 review, Repp calls the co-
incidence of the point of maximum ambiguity in the iden-
tification function with the peak in discrimination “the
essential defining characteristic of categorical perception”
(p. 253). Macmillan et al. (1977) generalize this, defining
CP as “the equivalence of discrimination and identifica-
tion measures,” which can take place “in the absence of a
boundary effect since there need be no local maximum in
discriminability” (p. 453).
In the same issue of Psychological Review in which
the influential paper of Macmillan etal. (1977) appeared,
Anderson, Silverstein, Ritz, and Jones (1977) applied to
CP a trainable neural network model for associative mem-
ory(the brain-state-in-a-box [BSB] model), based jointly
on neurophysiological considerations and linear systems
theory. Simulated labeling (identification) and ABX dis-
crimination curves were shown to be very much like those
published in the experimental psychology literature. In
the present paper, we will refer to such network models as
exhibiting synthetic CP. Unlike psychophysical studies
of real (human and animal) subjects, which have main-
tained an active profile, synthetic CP (with some impor-
tant exceptions, reviewed below) has remained largely
unexplored,2 despite the vast and continuing upsurge of
interest in neural models of perception and cognition be-
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ginning 10 or so years ago, as documented in the landmark
volume of Rumelhart and McClelland (1986) and updated
by Arbib (1995). An advantage of such computational
models is that, unlike real subjects, they can be “sys-
tematically manipulated” (Wood, 1978, p.583) to uncover
their operational principles, a point made more recently by
Hanson and Burr (1990), who write that “connectionist
models can be used to explore systematically the com-
plex interaction between learning and representation”
(p. 471).
The purpose of the present paper is to assess neural
net models of CP, with particular reference to their ability
to simulate the behavior of real observers. As with any
psychophysical model, the points in which synthetic CP
agrees with observation show that real perceptual and
cognitive systems could operate on the same principles
as those embodied in the model. Where real and synthetic
behaviors differ, this can suggest avenues for new exper-
imentation.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.
In the next section, we outline the historical development
of theories of CP and its psychophysical basis. We then
review various neural net models for synthetic CP. These
have mostly considered artificial or novel continua, where-
as experimental work with human subjects has usually
considered speech (or more accurately, synthetic, near-
speechstimuli), especially syllable-initial stop consonants.
Thus, we describe the use of two rather different neural
systems to model the perception of stops. The application
of signal detection theory (SDT) to synthetic CP is then
considered. Finally, the implications of the results of con-
nectionist modeling of CP are discussed, before we pre-
sent our conclusions and identify future work.
CHARACTERIZATION
OF CATEGORICAL PERCEPTION
CP is usually defined relative to some theoretical po-
sition. Views of CP have accordingly evolved in step with
perceptual theories. However CP is defined, the relation
between discrimination and identification remains a cen-
tral one. At the outset, we distinguish categorical percep-
tionfrom merecategorization (sorting) in that there is no
warping of discriminability, rated similarity, or interstim-
ulus representation distance (i.e., compression within
categories and separation between) in the latter. Also, CP
can be innate, as in the case of color vision (see, e.g., Born-
stein, 1987), or learned (see, e.g., Goldstone, 1994, 1998).
Early Characterizations
From Speech Categorical Perception
The phenomenon of CP was first observed and charac-
terized in the seminal studies of the perception of synthetic
speech at Haskins Laboratories, initiated by Liberman
etal. (1957; see Liberman, 1996, for a comprehensive his-
torical review). The impact of these studies on the field
has been tremendous. Massaro (1987b) writes, “the study
of speech perception has been almost synonymous with the
study of categorical perception” (p. 90).
Liberman et al. (1957) investigated the perception of
syllable-initial stop consonants (/b/, /d/, and / /) vary-
ing in place of articulation, cued by second formant tran-
sition. Liberman, Delattre, and Cooper (1958) went on to
study the voiced/voiceless contrast cued by first formant
(F1) cutback, or voice onset time (VOT).3 In both cases,
perception was found to be categorical, in that a steep la-
beling function and a peaked discrimination function (in
an ABX task) were observed, with the peak at the pho-
neme boundary corresponding to the 50% point of the la-
beling curve. Fry, Abramson, Eimas, and Liberman (1962)
found the perception of long, steady-state vowels to be
much “less categorical” than stop consonants.
An important finding of Liberman etal. (1958) was that
the voicing boundary depended systematically on place of
articulation. In subsequent work, Lisker and Abramson
(1970) found that, as the place of articulation moves back
in the vocal tract from bilabial (for a /ba–pa/ VOT con-
tinuum) through alveolar (/da–ta/) to velar (/ a–ka/), so
the boundary moves from about 25-msec VOT through
about 35msec to approximately 42msec. Why this should
happen is uncertain. For instance, Kuhl (1987) writes that
“we simply do not know why the boundary ‘moves’”
(p. 365). One important implication, however, is that CP
is more than merely bisecting a continuum; otherwise, the
boundary would be at midrange in all three cases.
At the time of the early Haskins work and for some years
thereafter, CP was thought to reflect a mode of percep-
tion special to speech (e.g., Liberman etal., 1967; Liber-
man et al., 1957; Studdert-Kennedy, Liberman, Harris,
& Cooper, 1970), in which the listener somehow made
reference to production. It was supposed that an early and
irreversible conversion of the continuous sensory repre-
sentation into a discrete, symbolic code subserving both
perception and production (motor theory) took place.
Thus, perception of consonants is supposedly more cat-
egorical than that of steady-state vowels because the ar-
ticulatory gestures that produce the former are more dis-
crete than the relatively continuous gestures producing
the latter.
Although there is little or no explicit mention of We-
ber’s law in early discussions of motor theory, its violation
is one of the aspects in which CP was implicitly supposed
to be special. Also, at that time, CP had not been observed
for stimuli other than speech, a situation that was soon to
change. According to Macmillan, Braida, and Goldberg
(1987), however, “all . . . discrimination data require
psychoacoustic explanation, whether they resemble We-
ber’s Law, display a peak, or are monotonic” (p. 32). De-
spite attempts to modify it suitably (e.g., Liberman, 1996;
Liberman and Mattingly, 1985, 1989), the hypothesis that
CP is special to speech has been unable to bear the weight
of accumulating contrary evidence.
One strong line of contrary evidence comes from
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Miller (1978), using nonhuman animal listeners who “by
definition, [have] no phonetic resources” (p.906). These
workers trained 4 chinchillas to respond differentially to
the 0- and 80-msec endpoints of a synthetic VOT contin-
uum, as developed by Abramson and Lisker (1970). They
then tested their animals on stimuli drawn from the full
0–80 msec range. Four human listeners also labeled the
stimuli for comparison. Kuhl and Miller found “no signif-
icant differences between species on the absolute valuesof
the phonetic boundaries . . . obtained, but chinchillas pro-
duced identification functions that were slightly, but sig-
nificantly, less steep” (p. 905). Figure 1 shows the mean
identification functions obtained for bilabial, alveolar, and
velar synthetic VOT series (Kuhl & Miller’s Figure 10).
In this figure, smooth curves have been fitted to the raw
data points (at 0, 10, 20, . . . 80 msec). Subsequently,
working with macaques, Kuhl and Padden (1982, 1983)
confirmed that these animals showed increased discrim-
inability at the phoneme boundaries. Although animal
experiments of this sort are methodologically challenging
and there have been difficulties in replication (e.g., How-
ell, Rosen, Laing, & Sackin, 1992, working with chin-
chillas), the convergence of human and animal data in
this study has generally been taken as support for the no-
tion that general auditory processing and/or learning
principles underlie this version of CP.
The emerging classical characterization of CP has
been neatly summarized by Treisman, Faulkner, Naish,
and Rosner (1995) as encompassing four features: “a
sharp category boundary, a corresponding discrimina-
tion peak, the predictability of discrimination function
from identification, and resistance to contextual effects”
(p.335). These authors go on to critically assess this char-
acterization, referring to “the unresolved difficulty that
identification data usually predict a lower level of dis-
crimination than is actually found” (pp. 336–337) as, for
example, in the work of Liberman et al. (1957), Macmil-
lan etal. (1977), Pastore (1987b), and Studdert-Kennedy
et al. (1970). They also remark on the necessity of quali-
fying “Studdert-Kennedy et al.’s claim that context ef-
fects[and other sequential dependencies] are weak or ab-
sent in categorical perception” (p. 337; see also Healy &
Repp, 1982). We will take the classical characterization
of CP to encompass only the first three aspects identified
above, given the now rather extensive evidence for con-
text effects and sequential dependencies (e.g., Brady &
Darwin, 1978; Diehl, Elman, & McCusker, 1978; Diehl
& Kluender, 1987; Repp & Liberman, 1987; Rosen,
1979) that can shift the category boundary.4
Signal Detection and Criterion-Setting Theories
The pioneering work at Haskins on phonetic catego-
rization took place at a time when psychophysics was
dominated by threshold models and before the influence
of SDT (Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman,
1991) was fully felt. Analyses based on SDT differ from
classical views of CP in two respects. First, SDT clearly
separates measures of sensitivity (d′ ) from measures of
response bias (β ). Second, the two views differ in the de-
tails of how discrimination is predicted from identifica-
tion, with labeling playing a central role in both aspects
of performance in the classical view. We deal with the
latter point in some detail below; brief remarks on the first
point follow immediately.
Figure1. Mean identification functions obtained for bilabial, alveolar, and
velar synthetic voice onset time (VOT) series for human listeners and chin-
chillas. Smooth curves have been fitted to the raw data points by probit analy-
sis. From “Speech Perception by the Chinchilla: Identification Functions for
Synthetic VOT Stimuli,” by P. K. Kuhl and J. D. Miller, 1978, Journal of the
Acoustical Society of America, 63, p. 913. Copyright 1978 by Acoustical So-
ciety of America. Reprinted with permission.846 DAMPER AND HARNAD
Figure 2A (after Massaro, 1987a) shows the transfor-
mation of stimulus to response in an identification or a
discrimination task as a two-stage process: a sensory op-
eration followed by a decision operation. This is obvi-
ously consistent with SDT’s separation of sensitivity fac-
tors (having to do with sensory perception) and response
bias (having to do with decision processes). The impor-
tance of this in the present context is that classical notions
of CP are ambiguous about which of the representations
are categorical: The information passed between the sen-
sory and the decision processes (labeled X in the figure)
could be categorical or continuous. In the latter case, this
still allows the response to be categorical, but this is not
CP on Massaro’s view, because the categorization does
not occur at the sensory/perceptual stage: He prefers the
term categorical partition. Emphasizing this distinction,
Massaro (1987b) writes, “I cannot understand why cate-
gorization behavior was (and continues to be) interpreted
as evidence for categorical perception. It is only natural
that continuous perception should lead to sharp category
boundaries along a stimulus continuum” (p.115). (See also
Hary & Massaro, 1982, and the reply of Pastore, Szcze-
siul, Wielgus, Nowikas, and Logan, 1984.)
According to SDT, X represents a continuousdecision
variate. In the simplest case, there are two kinds of pre-
sentation (historically called signal and signal-plus-
noise), and X is unidimensional. The two classes of pre-
sentation give rise to two normal distributions of equal
variance, one with a mean of zero and the other with a
mean of d′ . Stimuli are then judged to be from one class
or the other, according to whether they give rise to an X
value that is greater than or less than some internal crite-
rion. However, as was detailed by Macmillan etal. (1977)
and reviewed below, the paradigms used in the study of CP
have generally been more complex than this simple case.
Is the internal criterion fixed, or can it shift as experi-
ence changes? This question has been addressed in the
recent work of Treisman et al. (1995), who applied the
earlier criterion-setting theory (CST) of Treisman and
Williams (1984) to CP. According to CST, a sensory sys-
tem resets the response criterion between each trial ac-
cording to “the latest information available to it, about its
own sensory performance and the environment” (p.337),
leading to sequential dependencies. The relevance to CP
had been noted by Elman (1979), who suggested that con-
sonant adaptation effects might be due to such criterion
shifts. When applied to ABX discrimination, CST “is
shown to fit the data from the literature” (Treisman etal.,
1995, p.334), in that a peak occurs at the category bound-
ary. This is essentially because CST shares the basic as-
sumptions of the classical Haskins model (p.345), which
also predicts (from labeling) a peak, as will be described
below. Moreover, the absolute value of the observed dis-
crimination performance is close to that predicted by CST.
This is not the case with the Haskins model, which predicts
a lower performance than is actually observed, as will be
discussed immediately below. The better fit achieved by
CST, relative to the Haskins model, is attributed to the
former’s additional criterion-setting assumptions.
Prediction of Discrimination From Identification
In the classical Haskins view, discrimination in an
ABX task (as traditionally used in CP studies) is based on
covert labeling. First, A is labeled covertly (in the sense
A
B
Figure2. (A)The transformation of stimulus to response can be seen as a two-stage process of
a sensory operation followed by a decision operation. This is consistent with signal detection the-
ory’s separation of sensitivity and response bias measures. Redrawn from Massaro, 1987a. (B)In
Fujisaki and Kawashima’s (1969, 1970, 1971) dual-process theory, there are two routes from
sensory processing to decision: one continuous (X) and the other discrete (X′ ).NEURAL MODELS OF CP 847
that the subject is not required to report this judgment to
the investigator, as in overt identification), then B, then X:
If the A and B labels are different, the subject responds X
is A or X is B according to X’s label; otherwise, the subject
guesses. On this basis, ABX discrimination is predictable
from identification. Indeed, one of the criticisms of this
paradigm (e.g., Massaro & Oden, 1980; Pisoni & Lazarus,
1974) is that it promotes identification/labeling behav-
ior, thereby arguably promoting categorization behavior
also. For judgments involving just two categories, where
the prior probability of each is equal, the proportion cor-
rect in discrimination is predicted as 
P(C) = .5[1 + (pA   pB)2], (1)
where pA is the probability of identifying the A stimulus
as one of the two categories, pB is the probability of iden-
tifying the B stimulus as that same category, and the guess-
ing probability is .5 (Liberman et al., 1957; Macmillan
etal., 1977). It is well known that this model predicts dis-
crimination that is almost invariably lower than that ob-
served. CP theorists have usually played down this dis-
crepancy by emphasizing the correlation between the
predicted and the observed curves—that is, their similar,
nonmonotonic shape and the fact that they peak at approx-
imately the same (boundary) point.
Massaro (1987b) writes, “for some reason, the discrep-
ancy has never been a deterrent for advocates of cate-
gorical perception nor a central result for any alternative
view” (p.91). However, the dual-process model of Fujisaki
and Kawashima (1969, 1970, 1971) does indeed effec-
tively take this discrepancy as the basis of an alternative
view, in which both a continuous (auditory) and a categor-
ical (phonetic) mode of processing coexist (Figure 2B).
If the subject fails to label A and B differently via the cat-
egorical route, then, rather than guessing, the continuous
(but decaying) representations of A and B are consulted.
According to Macmillan et al. (1977, p. 454), the extent
to which Equation 1 underestimates discrimination deter-
mines the weight to be given to each process so as to fit
the data best. They criticize dual-process theory for “its
embarrassing lack of parsimony” (p. 467), however, in
that everything that can be done via the discrete route (and
more) can also be achieved via the continuous route. The
theory does, however, have other strengths. It can explain,
for instance, the effect that memory requirements of the
experimental procedure have on CP on the basis that the
two processes have different memory decay properties.
Macmillan et al. (1977) point out that the Haskins
model is tacitly based on low-threshold assumptions,5 ar-
guing that mere correlation between observed discrimi-
nation and that predicted from identification is inadequate
support for the notion of CP. By contrast, they character-
ize CP, on the basis of SDT, in terms of the equivalence
of discrimination and identification. The essential defin-
ing characteristic of CP is then considered to be the equiv-
alence of identification d′ , found by using the approach
proposed by Braida and Durlach (1972) for auditory in-
tensity perception, and discrimination d′ . The Braida
and Durlach model assumes a distribution correspond-
ing to each point on the continuum and then finds a d′ for
each adjacent pair of distributions. If we can find a d′
corresponding to the same pair of distributions in ABX
discrimination, these two sensitivity measures should be
equal, if discrimination is indeed predictable from iden-
tification.
To avoid the low-threshold assumptions of a discrete
set of internal states, Macmillan et al. (1977) extended
Green and Swets’ earlier (1966) derivation of d′ from
yes–no and two-interval forced-choice (2IFC) psycho-
physical tasks to the somewhat more complicated ABX
task. It was analyzed (pp.458–459) as a 2IFC subtask (to
determine whether the standards are in the order  AB  or
 BA ), followed by a yes–no subtask.6 This is described
as “a continuous (SDT) model for categorical percep-
tion” (p. 462). This view of the importance of continu-
ous information to CP is gaining ground over the classi-
cal characterization of CP. For instance, Treisman et al.
(1995) state that “CP resembles standard psychophysical
judgments” (p. 334), whereas Takagi (1995) writes, “in
fact, the signal detection model is compatible with both
categorical and continuous patterns of identification/dis-
crimination data” (p. 569).
NEURAL MODELS OF
CATEGORICAL PERCEPTION: A REVIEW
In this section, we present a historical review of syn-
thetic CP. 
The Brain-State-in-a-Box
Early neural models of categorical perception were es-
sentially based on associative memory networks—one
of the few kinds of net attracting any kind of interest in the
“dark ages” (see note2) before the discovery of the error
back-propagation algorithm (Rumelhart, Hinton, &
Williams, 1986). (See Hinton & Anderson, 1981, and
Kohonen, 1977, for extensive contemporary reviews of
parallel models of associative memory, and Anderson,
1995, for a more recent introductory treatment.) This is
quite a natural model for CP in many ways. An associative
net is addressed with some partial or noisy pattern and
retrieves the corresponding noise-free canonical pattern,
or prototype. This is akin to a pure or classical form of 
CP whereby a nonprototypical stimulus is replaced in
memory by its prototype (from which it is consequently
indistinguishable).
We will take Anderson, Silverstein, etal.’s (1977) paper
as the starting point for our review of neural models of
CP. We note, however, that this selection may be con-
tentious. Grossberg (1968a, 1968b, 1969), for example,
also has a legitimate claim to be the originator of this line
of research with his very early papers on neural models
of psychological functions, although Anderson’s work
on associative memory dates back at least as far (viz., An-
derson, 1968; see Carpenter, Grossberg, & Rosen, 1991a,
1991b, and Grossberg, 1987, for more recent develop-848 DAMPER AND HARNAD
ments.) We prefer the Anderson, Silverstein, etal. (1977)
model, because of its greater simplicity and perspicacity
and its more direct and obvious usefulness in modeling
human psychophysical data.
Anderson, Silverstein, et al. (1977) consider networks
of neurons,7which “are simple analog integrators of their
inputs” (p. 416). They extend the earlier work mentioned
above (e.g., Anderson, 1968) in two main ways. It had
previously been assumed (p. 413) that (1) nervous system
activity could be represented by the pattern of activation
across a group of cells, (2)different memory traces make
use of the same synapses, and (3)synapses associate two
patterns by incrementing synaptic weights in proportion
to the product of pre- and postsynaptic activities.
The form of learning implied in the third assumption
is, in effect, correlational and has been called Hebbianby
many workers. Since the neurons have linear activation
functions, a form of linear correlation is computed, mak-
ing the net amenable to analysis with linear systems the-
ory as follows.
Suppose N-dimensional input pattern vectors fi are to
be associated with M-dimensional output pattern vectors
gi. A net is created with N input units and M output units.
In accordance with the second assumption above, f and g
are to be represented by the patterns of activation across
the input and output units, respectively. Then, according to
the learning scheme, the (M N) connection matrix Aof
synaptic weights between the two sets of units is incre-
mented by
Ai = gigT
i, (2)
where T denotes the vector transpose. In this way, the
overall connectivity matrix is determined as A = Σ iAi,
summed over all Iinput patterns. If all inputs are mutually
orthogonal, the output for any fk will be
since, by the definition of orthogonality,
Hence, the system operates as a perfect associator in this
case: The direction of the output vector is identical to
that of the associated input vector. (The length, however,
is modified by the length of the input vector and will also
depend on the number of repetitions of that input in ac-
cordance with Equation 2.) When the inputs are not or-
thogonal, the net will produce noise, as well as the cor-
rect output, but it will still be “quite usable” (Anderson,
Silverstein, et al., 1977, p. 417).
To convert this linear pattern-association net into a
model of CP, Anderson, Silverstein, etal. (1977) made two
extensions. The first was to discard the M distinct output
units and to introduce positive feedback from the set of
Ninput neurons onto itself. The (N N) matrix A(which
they now call the feedback matrix) is made symmetric in
this case, so that the synaptic weight between units i and
jis equal to that between units jand i: aij= aji. For the case
of arbitrary (nonorthogonal) inputs, it is shown(Anderson,
Silverstein, et al., 1977, p. 424) that (provided their aver-
age is zero) the inputs are a linear combination of the
eigenvectors of the feedback matrix A and that all eigen-
values are positive.
The introduction of positive feedback makes the system
potentially unbounded, in that activations can now grow
without limit. The second extension overcomes this prob-
lem by allowing the individual neurons to saturate at an
activation of  C. That is, the activation function of each
neuron is linear-with-saturation. Thus, in use, all the units
are eventually driven into saturation (either positive or neg-
ative in sense), and the net has stable states corresponding
to some (possibly all) of the corners of a hypercube (box)
in its N-dimensional state space. (Of course, not all corners
are necessarily stable.) For this reason, the model was
called brain-state-in-a-box. Considered as vectors in the
state space, these corners are the eigenvectors of Aand can
be identified, in psychological terms, with the distinctive
featuresof the system (Anderson, Silverstein, etal., 1977,
p. 425). For each such stable state, there is a region of at-
traction in state space such that, if an input initially pro-
duces an output in this region, that outputwill evolve over
time to reach that stable state, where it will remain.
Used as a model of CP, the inputs (i.e., the fi) are asso-
ciated with themselves during training—that is, during
computation of the (N   N) matrix A. This is an essen-
tially unsupervised operation. However, if the training pat-
terns are labeled with their pattern class, the corners of the
box can be similarly labeled according to the input patterns
that they attract. (There is, of course, no guarantee that all
the corners will be so labeled. Corners that remain unla-
beled correspond to rubbish states, in the jargon of as-
sociative networks.) Thereafter, an initial noisy input (con-
sisting of a linear sum of eigenvectors) within the region of
attraction of a labeled corner will evoke an output that is a
canonicalor prototypical form corresponding to the eigen-
vector of the input with the largest eigenvalue. Anderson,
Silverstein, et al. (1977, pp. 430–433) present a simula-
tion of CP in which their neural model performed two-
class identification and ABX discrimination tasks. The two
prototypes (eigenvectors) were the eight-dimensional or-
thogonal vectors of length two in the directions (1,1,1,1,
 1, 1, 1, 1) and (1,1, 1, 1,1,1, 1, 1), respectively
(Figure 3A). These were used to set the weights as de-
tailed above. Inputs to the model then consisted of 100 rep-
etitions of 16 length-one vectors equally spaced between
the prototype eigenvectors, with added zero-mean Gauss-
ian noise according to one of four conditions: The stan-
dard deviation (SD) of the noise was 0.0, 0.1, 0.2, or 0.4.
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We have replicated Anderson, Silverstein, etal.’s (1977)
simulation. Weights were calculated from the inner prod-
uct of each of the two training patterns with itself, added
to produce the feedback matrix in accordance with Equa-
tion 2. Testing used 1,000 presentations under three dif-
ferent noise conditions. During testing, the activation of
each neuron was computed as 
acti(t)=   α (extinputi(t)) + β (intinputi(t)), (3)
where extinputi and intinputi are, as their names clearly
suggest, the external input to unit i and the internal (feed-
back) input to the same unit. A decay term,
∆ acti(t)=   α (extinputi(t)) + β (intinputi(t)) 
  (decay)acti(t),
can be incorporated into the model, which tends to restore
activation to a resting level of zero. Throughout this work,
decay was set to 1 so that the activation is given simply by
Equation 3.
For the replication of Anderson, Silverstein, et al.’s
(1977) simulation, the external scale factor α and the in-
ternal scale factor β were both set at .1. The saturation
limit for the neurons was set at C =  1. Self-connections
between neurons were allowed. We also found it necessary
to use rather more noise power than Anderson, Silverstein,
et al. did. We believe this is because our use of 1,000 test
patterns (in place of Anderson, Silverstein, et al.’s 100)
makes our results less affected by small-sample effects.
Thus, our noise conditions were SD = 0.0, 0.4, and 0.7.
In all noise-free cases, the system converged to one of
its two stable, saturating states for all 1,000 inputs. For the
added noise conditions, there was only a very small like-
lihood of convergence to an unlabeled corner (rubbish
state). This occurred for approximately 1% of the inputs
when SD = 0.4 and for about 6% when SD = 0.7. Fig-
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brain-state-in-a-box neural model. Inputs consisted of 16 equally spaced length-
one vectors, as shown, with added noise. Redrawn from Anderson, Silverstein,
Ritz, and Jones (1977). (B)Response of model for the simulated identification task
with 1,000 presentations at each noise condition: The standard deviation was 0.0,
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ure 3B shows the identification results obtained by not-
ing the proportion of inputs that converged to the saturat-
ing state corresponding to endpoint 0. For the no-noise
condition, categorization was perfect with the class bound-
aryat the midpoint between the prototypes. For the noise
conditions, SD = 0.4 and SD = 0.7, the labeling curves
were very reasonable approximations to those seen in the
classical CP literature. Overall, this replicated the essen-
tial findings of Anderson, Silverstein, et al. (1977).
Consider next the ABX discrimination task. Anderson,
Silverstein, et al. (1977) considered two inputs to the 
net to be discriminable if they converged to different sta-
ble states. (Note that since Anderson, Silverstein, et al.
were considering a simple two-class problem with con-
vergence to one or the other of the two labeled states and
no rubbish states, they were never in the situation of hav-
ing A, B, and X all covertly labeled differently, as can
conceivably happen in reality.) If they converged to the
same stable state, a guess was made with a probability of
.5, in accordance with Equation 1. This means that dis-
crimination by the net was effectively a direct imple-
mentation of the Haskins model. Indeed, Anderson, Sil-
verstein, et al. observed a distinct peak at midrange for
their intermediate-noise condition, just as in classical
CP. Finally, they obtained simulated reaction times by
noting the number of iterations required to converge to a
stable, saturating state. As in classical CP (e.g., Pisoni &
Tash, 1974), there was an increase in reaction time for in-
puts close to the category boundary for the intermediate-
noise condition, relative to inputs more distant from the
boundary. Again, we have replicated these findings (re-
sults not shown).
In support of the assertion that the model is “quite us-
able” when the inputs are not orthogonal, Anderson (1977,
pp.78–83) presents an example in which the BSB model
was used to categorize vowel data (see also Anderson, Sil-
verstein, & Ritz, 1977). Twelve Dutch vowels were repre-
sented by eight-dimensional vectors, each element mea-
suring the energy within a certain frequency band of an
average, steady-state vowel. It is highly unlikely that
these inputs were mutually orthogonal; yet, “when learn-
ing ceased, each vowel was assigned to a different cor-
ner” (p.81). Indeed, as was mentioned earlier, nonorthog-
onality can act as noise, thus preventing (unrealistic)
perfect categorization.
Anderson, Silverstein, et al. (1977) conjecture that
positive feedback, saturation, and synaptic learning were
“responsible for the interesting [categorization] effects in
our simulations” (p. 433). With the benefit of hindsight,
however, we now know (on the basis of the extensive re-
view material and the new results below) that synthetic
categorization can be obtained in a variety of neural mod-
els, even those lacking positive feedback and saturation.
In this regard, the comments of Grossberg (1986) con-
cerning saturation in the BSB model are apposite. He
charged Anderson, Silverstein, et al. with introducing a
homunculus as a result of their “desire to preserve the
framework of linear systems theory.” He continues: “No
physical process is defined to justify the discontinuous
change in the slope of each variable when it reaches an
extreme of activity . . . The model thus invokes a ho-
munculus to explain . . . categorical perception”(pp. 192–
194).
In our view, however, a homunculus is an unjustified,
implicit mechanism that is, in the worst case, comparable
in sophistication and complexity to the phenomenon to be
explained. By contrast, Anderson, Silverstein, etal. (1977)
postulate an explicit mechanism (firing-rate saturation)
that is both simple and plausible, in that something like it
is a ubiquitous feature of neural systems. In the words of
Lloyd (1989), “homunculi are tolerable provided they can
ultimately be discharged by analysis into progressively
simpler subunculi, until finally each micrunculus is so
stupid that we can readily see how a mere bit of biologi-
cal mechanism could take over its duties” (p. 205). An-
derson, Silverstein, et al. go so far as to tell us what this
“mere bit of biological mechanism” is—namely, rate sat-
uration in neurons. (See Grossberg, 1978, and the reply
thereto of Anderson & Silverstein, 1978, for additional
discussion of the status of the nonlinearity in the Ander-
son, Silverstein, et al. BSB model; see also Bégin &
Proulx, 1996, for a more recent commentary.) To be sure,
the discontinuity of the linear-with-saturation activation
function is biologically and mathematically unsatisfac-
tory, but essentially similar behavior is observed in neural
models with activation functions having a more gradual
transition into saturation (as will be detailed below).
The TRACE Model
In 1986, McClelland and Elman produced a detailed
connectionist model of speech perception that featured lo-
calist representations and extensive top-down processing,
in addition to the more usual bottom-up flow of informa-
tion. This model, TRACE, is now rather well known, so it
will be described only briefly here. There are three levels
to the full model, corresponding to the (localist) feature,
phoneme, and word units. Units at different levels that are
mutually consistent with a given interpretation of the input
have excitatory connections, whereas those within a level
that are contradictory have inhibitory connections—that
is, processing is competitive.
Strictly speaking, TRACE is as much a model of lexical
accessing as of speech perception per se, as the existence
of the word units makes plain. McClelland and Elman
(1986) assumed an input in terms of something like dis-
tinctive features, which sidesteps important perceptual
questions about how the distinctive features are derived
from the speech signal and, indeed, about whether this is
an appropriate representation or not. In their 1986 Cogni-
tive Psychology paper, McClelland and Elman describe
TRACE II, which, they say, is “designed to account primar-
ily for lexical influences in phoneme perception” using
“mock speech” as input (p.13). However, they also refer to
TRACE I, which is “designed to address some of the chal-
lenges posed by the task of recognizing phonemes in real
speech” and cite Elman and McClelland (1986) for further
details. Unfortunately, TRACEI does not feature real speech
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Top-down effects are manifest through the lexical sta-
tus (or otherwise) of words affecting (synthetic) phoneme
perception and, thereby, (synthetic) feature perception
also. Although TRACE has been used to simulate a variety
of effects in speech perception, we concentrate here on its
use in the modeling of CP.
An 11-step / /–/k/ continuum was formed by inter-
polating the feature values—namely, VOT and the onset
frequency of the first formant, F1. The endpoints of the
continuum (Stimuli 1 and 11) were more extreme than
prototypical / / and /k/, which occurred at Points 3 and
9, respectively. The word units were removed, thus ex-
cluding any top-down lexical influence, and all phoneme
units other than / / and /k/ were also removed. Figure4A
shows the initial activations (at time step t = 1) at these
two units as a function of stimulus number. As can be
seen, there was a clear trend for the excitation (which
was initially entirely bottom-up) to favor / / at a low stim-
ulus number but /k/ at a high stimulus number. The two
curves cross at Stimulus 6, indicating that this condition
was maximally ambiguous (i.e., this was the phoneme
boundary). However, the variation was essentially con-
tinuous rather than categorical, as is shown by the rela-
tive shallowness of the curves. By contrast, after 60 time
steps, the two representations were as shown in Figure4B.
As a result of the mutual inhibition between the / / and
/k/ units and, possibly, of the top-down influence of pho-
neme units on featural units also, a much steeper (more
categorical) response was seen.
This appears to be a natural consequence of the com-
petition between excitatory and inhibitory processing.
Many researchers have commented on this ubiquitous
finding. For instance, Grossberg (1986) states, “Categor-
ical perception can . . . be anticipated whenever adaptive
filtering interacts with sharply competitive tuning, not just
in speech recognition experiments” (p. 239).
McClelland and Elman (1986) go on to model overt
labeling of the phonemes, basing identification on a
variant of Luce’s (1959) choice rule. The result is shown
in Figure4C, which also depicts the ABX discrimination
function. The choice rule involves setting a constant k
(actually equal to 5), which acts as a free parameter in a
curve-fitting sense. Quinlan (1991) accordingly makes
the following criticism of TRACE: “Indeed, k determined
the shape of the identification functions. . . . A rather un-
charitable conclusion . . . is that the model has been fixed
up to demonstrate categorical perception. . . . Categori-
cal perception does not follow from any of the a priori
functional characteristics of the net” (p. 151). It is also
apparent that the obtained ABX discrimination curve is
not very convincing, having a rather low peak relative to
those found in psychophysical experiments.
We consider finally the relation between discrimina-
tion and identification in TRACE. McClelland and Elman
(1986) point out that discrimination in real CP is better
than that predicted from identification and that TRACE
also “produces this kind of approximate categorical per-
ception” (p. 47). The mechanism by which this happens
is an interaction of the bottom-up activations produced by
the speech input with the top-down activations. According
to the authors, the former decay with time, but not entirely
to zero, whereas the latter produce a more canonical rep-
resentation with time but do not completely overwrite the
input with its prototype (and the time course of these in-
teractions gives a way of predicting the increase in reac-
tiontime for stimuli close to the category boundary). The
authors remark on the practical difficulty of distinguish-
ing between this feedback explanation and a dual-process
explanation.
Back-Propagation
As is well known, the field of neural computing re-
ceived a major boost with the discovery of the error back-
propagation algorithm (Rumelhart etal., 1986) for training
feedforward nets with hidden units, so-called multilayer
perceptrons (MLPs). It is, therefore, somewhat surprising
that back-propagation learning has not figured more
widely in studies of synthetic CP. We have used this al-
gorithm as the basis for modeling the CP of both speech
(dealt with in the next section) and artificial stimuli (dealt
with here).
Many workers (Baldi & Hornik, 1989; Bourland &
Kamp, 1988; Elman & Zipser, 1988; Hanson & Burr,
1990) have observed that feedforward auto-associative
nets8 with hidden units effectively perform a principal
component analysis of their inputs. Harnad, Hanson, and
Lubin (1991) exploited auto-association training to pro-
duce a precategorization discrimination function. This
was then reexamined after categorization training, to see
whether it had warped. That is, a CP effect was defined
as a decrease in within-category interstimulus distances
and/or an increase in between-category interstimulus dis-
tances relative to the baseline of auto-association alone.
The stimuli studied were artificial—namely, different rep-
resentations of the length of (virtual) lines—and the net’s
task was to categorize these as short or long.
A back-propagation net with 8 input units, a single hid-
den layer of 2–12 units, and 8 or 9 output units was used.
The eight different input lines were represented in six dif-
ferent ways, to study the effect of the iconicityof the input
coding (i.e., how analogue, nonarbitrary, or structure pre-
serving it was in relation to what it represented).9 After
auto-association training (using 8 output units), the trained
weights between hidden layer and output layer were re-
loaded, the input to hidden layer weights were set to small
random values, and training recommenced. The net was
given a double task: auto-association (again) and cate-
gorization. For the latter, the net had to label Lines 1–4
(for instance) as short and 5–8 as long. This required an
additional output, making 9 in this case.
Strong CP effects (with warping of similarity space in
the form of increased separation across the category
boundary and compression within a category) were ob-
served for all the input representations: The strongest ef-
fect was obtained with the least iconic, most arbitrary
(place) code. The categorization task was very difficult852 DAMPER AND HARNAD
to learn with only two hidden units, h = 2. With more
hidden units, however, the pattern of behavior did not
change with increasing h (3–12). This is taken to indicate
that CP was not merely a by-product of information com-
pressionby the hidden layer. Nor was CP a result of over-
learning to extreme values, because the effect was present
(albeit smaller) for larger values of the epsilon ( ) error
criterion in the back-propagation algorithm. A test was
also made to determine whether CP was an artifact of re-
using the weights for the precategorization discrimina-
tion (auto-association) for the auto-association-plus-
categorization nets. Performance was averaged over sev-
eral precategorization nets and was compared with perfor-
mance averaged over several different auto-association-
plus-categorization nets. Again, although weaker and not
always present, there was still evidence of synthetic CP.
A final test concerned iconicity and interpolation:
Was the CP restricted to trained stimuli, or would it gen-
eralize to untrained ones? Nets were trained on auto-
association in the usual way, and then, during categoriza-
tion training, some of the lines were left untrained (say,
Line 3 and Line 6) to see whether they would neverthe-
less warp in the “right” direction. Interpolation of the CP
effects to untrained lines was found, but only for the
coarse-coded representations.
A “provisional conclusion” of Harnad et al. (1991) was
that “whatever was responsible for it, CP had to be some-
thing very basic to how these nets learned” (p.70). In this
and subsequent work (Harnad, Hanson, & Lubin, 1995), the
time-course of the training was examined, and three im-
portant factors in generating synthetic CP were identified:
(1) maximal interstimulus separation induced during
auto-association learning, with the hidden-unit represen-
tations of each (initially random) stimulus moving as far
apart from one another as possible; (2) stimulus move-
ment to achieve linear separability during categorization
learning, which undoes some of the separation achieved
in the first factor above, in a way that promotes within-
category compression and between-category separation;
and (3) inverse-distance “repulsive force” at the category
boundary, pushing the hidden-unit representation away
from the boundary and resulting from the form of the (in-
verse exponential) error metric, which is minimized dur-
ing learning.
One further factor—the iconicity of the input codings—
was also found to modulate CP. The general rule is that
the further the initial representation is from satisfying the
partition implied in Points1–3 above (i.e., the less iconic
it is), the stronger the CP effect. Subsequently, Tijsseling
and Harnad (1997) carried out a more detailed analysis,
focusing particularly on the iconicity. Contrary to the re-
port of Harnad et al. (1995), they found no overshoot, as
in Point 2 above. They concluded, “CP effects usually
occur with similarity-based categorization, but their mag-
nitude and direction vary with the set of stimuli used,
how [these are] carved up into categories, and the distance
between those categories” (p. 268).
This work indicates that a feedforward net trained on
back-propagation is able (despite obvious dissimilarities)
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Figure 4. Categorical perception in the TRACE model. (A) Ini-
tial activation of the / / and /k/ units arising from bottom-up in-
fluence of the feature units, at time step t = 1. (B) Activations at
time step t = 60. (C) Labeling functions after postprocessing,
using Luce’s choice model with k = 5, and ABX discrimination
curve. Redrawn from McClelland and Elman (1986).NEURAL MODELS OF CP 853
to replicate the essential features of classical CP much as
the BSB model of Anderson, Silverstein, etal. (1977)did.
There are, however, noteworthy differences. The most
important is that Harnad et al.’s (1991) back-propagation
nets were trained on intermediate (rather than solely on
endpoint) stimuli. Thus, generalization testing is a more
restricted form of interpolation. Also (because the feed-
forward net has no dynamic behavior resulting from
feedback), reaction times cannot be quite so easily pre-
dicted as in Anderson, Silverstein, et al. (but see below). 
Competitive Learning
and Category-Detecting Neurons
Goldstone, Steyvers, and Larimer (1996) report on a
laboratory experiment with human subjects in which stim-
ulifrom a novel dimension were categorically perceived.
The stimuli were created by interpolating (morphing)
seven curves between two randomly selected bezier end-
point curves. The dimension was novel in that the subjects
were highly unlikely ever to have seen precisely those
morphed shapes before. The major interest, in the context
of this paper, is that Goldstone etal. also present a neural
model (a form of radial-basis function net) that qualita-
tively replicates the behavioral results.
The model has a layer of hidden neurons that become
specialized for particular stimulus regions, thereby acting
as category-detecting neurons in the sense of Amari and
Takeuchi (1978) or feature-detecting neuronsin the sense
of Schyns (1991). This is done by adjusting the input-to-
hidden (or position) weights. Simultaneously, associa-
tions between hidden/detector neurons and output (cate-
gory) units are learned by gradient descent. In addition
to the feedforward connections from input-to-hidden and
from hidden-to-output units, there is feedback from the
category units, which causes the detector units to con-
centrate near the category boundary. This works by in-
creasing the position-weight learning rate for detectors
that areneighbors of a detector that produces an improper
categorization.Note that the whole activity pattern of the
hidden detectors determines the activity of the category
nodes. This, in turn, determines the error and, thus, the
learning rate. No single detector can determine the learn-
ing rate (Mark Steyvers, personal communication, July 9,
1997).
Goldstone et al. (1996) mention the similarity of the
classification part of their model to ALCOVE (Kruschke,
1992). Like ALCOVE, the hidden nodes are radial-basis
function units “activated according to the psychological
similarity of the stimulus to the exemplar at the position
of the hidden node” (p. 23). The essential difference is
that Goldstone et al.’s exemplar nodes are topologically
arranged and can move their position in input space
through competitive learning of their position weights.
Simulations were performed with input patterns
drawn from 28 points on the morphed continuum. (Two-
dimensional gray-scale drawings of the curves were con-
verted to Gabor filter representations describing the in-
puts in terms of spatially organized line segments.) There
were 14 hidden exemplar/detector neurons and 2 output/
category neurons. Like the experiments with the human
subjects, the simulations involved learning two different
classifications according to different cut-offs along the
novel dimension. In one condition (left split), the cut-off
(boundary) was placed between Stimuli 10 and 11; in the
other condition (right split), it was placed between Stim-
uli 18 and 19. In both cases, classical CP was observed.
Although Luce’s (1959) choice rule is apparently used in
the Goldstone et al. (1996) model, it seems that the k pa-
rameter, which was treated by McClelland and Elman
(1986) as free in the TRACE model and was adjusted to
give CP, is here treated as fixed (at unity). The labeling
probability showed a characteristic warping, with its 50%
point being at the relevant boundary. Discrimination be-
tween two stimuli was assessed by taking the Euclidean
distance between their hidden-node activation patterns.
This revealed a peak in sensitivity at or near the relevant
category boundary.
Unfortunately, Goldstone etal. (1996) did not (and can-
not) make a strict comparison of their human and simu-
lationdata, because of the different numbers of curves in
the two continua studied. Recall that 7 morphed curves
constituted the continuum for the experiments with human
subjects, whereas a morphing sequence of 28 curves was
used in the simulations. Such a comparison could have
been very revealing for understanding synthetic CP. None-
theless, there is sufficient coincidence of the form of
their results in the two cases to show that neural nets can
indeed make credible models of learned categorization.
The authors contrast their work with that of Anderson,
Silverstein, etal. (1977) and Harnad etal. (1995). In these
other approaches, they say, “each category has its own
attractor,”10 so that CP “occurs because inputs that are
very close but fall into different categories will be driven
to highly separated attractors” (Goldstone et al., 1996,
p.248). In their net, however, detectors congregate at the
category boundary, and thus “small differences . . . will
be reflected by [largely] different patterns of activity.”
These aspects of their work are presented as potentially
advantageous. However, they seem to run counter to the
prevailing view in speech CP research, according to which
the paradigm “has overemphasized the importance of the
phonetic boundary between categories” (Repp, 1984,
p. 320) at the expense of exploring the internal structure
of the categories in terms of anchors and/or prototypes
(e.g., Guenter & Gjaja, 1996; Iverson & Kuhl, 1995; Kuhl,
1991; Macmillan, 1987; J. L. Miller, 1994; Volaitis &
Miller, 1992; but see Lotto et al., 1998). 
CATEGORIZATION OF STOP
CONSONANTS BY NEURAL NETWORKS
From the foregoing review, it is apparent that (given
the right encoding schema for the inputs) neural models
of CP have no real problem replicating the classical ob-
servations of a sharp labeling function and a peaked dis-
crimination function, at least for learned categorization.854 DAMPER AND HARNAD
Although there may sometimes be contrary suspicions
(as when Luce’s choice rule is used in the TRACE model
or nets are trained to place the category boundary at a
particular point on the input continuum), the effects are
sufficiently robust across a variety of different architec-
tures and approaches to support the claim that they re-
flect the emergent behavior of any reasonably powerful
learning system (see below). With the exception of the
vowel categorization work using the BSB model (Ander-
son, 1977; Anderson, Silverstein, et al., 1977), however,
the neural models of synthetic CP reviewed thus far have
all taken their inputs from artificial or novel dimensions,
whereas the vast majority of real CP studies have used
speech stimuli—most often, stop consonants (or, more
correctly, simplified analogues of such sounds). Our goal
in this section is, accordingly, to consider the categoriza-
tionof stop consonants by a variety of neural models. As
was mentioned earlier, an important aspect of the cate-
gorization of stop consonants is the shift of the category
boundary with place of articulation. Thus, it is of consid-
erable interest to ascertain whether neural models of CP
reproduce this effect as emergent behavior.
Stimuli and Preprocessing
The stimuli used in this section were synthesized
consonant–vowel syllables supplied by Haskins Labora-
tories and nominally identical to those used by Kuhl and
Miller (1978), which were developed earlier by Abramson
and Lisker (1970). Stimuli very much like these, if not
identical to them, have been used extensively in studies
of speech CP: they have become a gold standard for this
kind of work. They consist of three series, digitally sam-
pled at 10 kHz, in which VOT varies in 10-msec steps
from 0 to 80 msec, simulating a series of English, pre-
stressed, bilabial (/ba–pa/), alveolar (/da–ta/), and
velar (/ a–ka/) syllables. Each stimulus began with a
release burst, and the two acoustic variables of aspiration
duration and F1 onset frequency were then varied simul-
taneouslyin order to simulate the acoustic consequences
of variation in VOT. Strictly, then, the VOT continuum is
not unidimensional. However, as was mentioned in note3,
these two variables have often been thoughtto be perfectly
correlated.
The stimuli were preprocessed for presentation to the
various nets, using a computational model of the periph-
eral auditory system (Pont & Damper, 1991). The use of
such sophisticated preprocessing obviously requires some
justification. We know from above that the iconicity of
the input representation to the network is important: the
closer the representation to that “seen” by the real ob-
server the better. Also, there has long been a view in the
speech research literature that CP reflects some kind of
“restructuring of information” (Kuhl & Miller, 1978,
p. 906) by the auditory system in the form of processing
nonlinearities. We wished, accordingly, to find correlates
of CP in the neural activity of the auditory system, fol-
lowing Sinex and McDonald (1988), who write: “It is of
interest to know how the tokens from a VOT continuum
are represented in the peripheral auditory system, and
whether [they] tend to be grouped in a way which predicts
the psychophysical results” (p. 1817). Also, as a step to-
ward understanding the acoustic-auditory restructuring
of information, we wished to discover the important
acoustic features that distinguish initial stops. In the
words of Nossair and Zahorian (1991), who used auto-
matic speech recognition techniques for this purpose,
“Such features might be more readily identifiable if the
front-end spectral processing more closely approximated
that performed by the human auditory system” (p.2990).
Full details of the preprocessing are described elsewhere
(Damper, Pont, & Elenius, 1990). Only a brief and some-
what simplified description follows.
The output of the auditory model is a neurogram (or
neural spectrogram) depicting the time of firing of a set
of 128 simulated auditory nerve fibers in response to
each stimulus applied at time t = 0 at a simulated sound
pressure level of 65 dB. Spacing of the filters in the fre-
quency dimension, according to the Greenwood (1961)
equation, corresponds to equal increments of distance
along the basilar membrane. Because of the tonotopic
(frequency–place) organization of auditory nerve fibers
and the systematic spacing of the filters across the 0–5kHz
frequency range, the neural spectrogram is a very effective
time–frequency representation. The high data rate associ-
ated with the full representation is dramatically reduced
by summing nerve firings (spikes) within time–frequency
cells to produce a two-dimensional matrix. Spikes are
counted in a (12   16)-bin region stretching from  25
to 95 msec in 10-msec steps in the time dimension and
from 1 to 128 in steps of eight in the frequency (fiber CF
index)dimension. Thus, the nets have a maximum of 192
inputs. These time limits were chosen to exclude most
(but not all) of the prestimulus spontaneous activity and
the region where responses were expected to be entirely
characteristic of the vowel. The impact on synthetic CP of
the number and placement of these time–frequency cells
has not yet been investigated systematically, just because
the initial scheme that we tried worked so well. Some prior
thought was given to the resolutions chosen. The 10-msec
width of the time bin corresponds approximately to one
pitch period. The grouping into eight contiguous filters,
in conjunction with equi-spacing according to the Green-
wood equation, corresponds to a cell width that is an ap-
proximately constant fraction (about 0.7) of the critical
bandwidth.
Since the auditory preprocessor is stochastic in nature
(because of its simulation of mechanical-to-neural trans-
duction in the hair cells of the cochlea), repetitions of the
same input stimulus produce statistically different outputs.
This fact is very convenient: It means that a sufficiently
large data set for training the neural models can be gener-
ated simply by running the preprocessor repeatedly with
the same input. In this work, 50 repetitions were used for
each of the three (bilabial, velar, and alveolar) series, toNEURAL MODELS OF CP 855
produce neural spectrograms for training and testing the
nets. 
Brain-State-in-a-Box Model
There was a distinct net for each of the (bilabial, alve-
olar, and velar) stimulus series. The input data were first
reduced to (approximately) zero-mean bipolar patterns
by subtracting 5 from each value. This was sufficient to
ensure that negative saturating states were appropriately
used in forming attractors, in addition to positive satu-
rating states. Initially, simulations used all 192 inputs. A
possible problem was anticipated as follows. The num-
ber of potential attractor states (corners of the box) in the
BSB model grows exponentially with the number of in-
puts: In this case, we have 2192potential attractors. Clearly,
with such a large number, the vast majority of states must
remain unlabeled. This will only be a problem, however,
if a test input is actually in the region of attraction of
such an unlabeled (rubbish) state. In the event, this did
not happen. However, training was still unsuccessful in
that the different endpoint stimuli (canonical voiced or
0-msec VOT, and canonical unvoiced or 80-msec VOT)
were attracted to the same stable states: There was no
differentiation between the different endpoints. This was
taken as an indication that the full 192-value patterns
were more similar to one another than they were different.
In view of this, the most important time–frequency
cells were identified by averaging the endpoint responses
and taking their difference. The N cells with the largest
associated absolute values were then chosen to form the
inputs to an N-input, N-unit BSB net. This is a form of
orthogonalization. Ideally, this kind of preanalysis is best
avoided: The neural model ought to be powerful enough
in its own right to discover the important inputs. Prelim-
inary testing indicated that results were not especially
sensitive to the precise value of N, provided it was in the
range somewhere between about 10 and 40. A value of
20 was therefore chosen. These 20 most important time–
frequency cells are located around the low-frequency re-
gion (corresponding to 200–900 Hz) just after acoustic
stimulus onset, where voicing activity varies maximally
as VOT varies. The precise time location of this region
shifts in the three nets (bilabial, alveolar, and velar) in
the same way as does the boundary point. The nets were
then trained on the 0- and 80-msec endpoints, and gener-
alization was tested on the full range of stimuli, includ-
ing the (unseen) intermediate (10–70 msec) stimuli.
Because of the relatively large number (100) of training
patterns contributing to the feedback matrix (Equation 2)
and, hence, to the weights, it was necessary to increase
the neuron saturation limit markedly (to C =  20,000).
The external scale factor was set at α = 0.1, and the in-
ternal scale factor at β = 0.05. These values were arrived
at by trial and error; network behavior was not especially
sensitive to the precise settings. Again, self-connections
between neurons were allowed. It was found that the 0-
msec (voiced) training patterns were always assigned
different corners from the 80-msec (unvoiced) patterns.
During generalization testing, no rubbish states were en-
countered: Convergence was always to a labeled attractor.
Moreover, the activation vector (after convergence) for
the 0-msec stimuli was found to be the same after train-
ing for all three series (i.e., the voiced stimuli all shared
the same attractors, irrespective of place of articulation).
The same was true of the 80-msec (unvoiced) endpoint
stimuli. (This would, of course, be a problem if the task
of the net were to identify the place of articulation, rather
than the presence/absence of voicing.)
Figure 5A shows the identification function obtained
by plotting the proportion of the 50 presentations which
converged to a state labeled voiced for each of the three
series; Figure5B shows the one-step discrimination func-
tion (averaged over 1,000 presentations) obtained using
the procedure of Anderson, Silverstein, et al. (1977), as
was described in the Brain-State-in-a-Box subsection
above. The results are clear and unequivocal: Classical
categorization was observed with a steep labeling curve
and an ABX discrimination peak at the category bound-
ary. Although the labeling curve was rather too steep and
the actual boundary values obtained were slightly low (by
about 5 or 10 msec), the shift with place of articulation
was qualitatively correct. The finding of correct order of
boundary placement was very consistent across replica-
tions with different scale factors. We take this to be an in-
dication of its significance. With these more realistic input
patterns, there was no need to add noise, as there was in
the case of the artificial (vectors) input.
Figure 6A shows the alveolar labeling curve from Fig-
ure 5 plotted together with the Kuhl and Miller (1978)
human and chinchilla data. This confirms that the BSB
model’ssynthetic identification functions were a reason-
able, but not exact, replication of the human and animal
data. It was not possible to apply probit analysis to deter-
mine the phonetic boundary for the (alveolar) BSB model,
because there was only a single point that was neither
100% or 0%. Obviously, the boundary was somewhere
between 20 and 30msec. Also, the synthetic function was
closer to the chinchilla data than to the human data. The
root-mean square (RMS) difference between the BSB
function and the animal data was 19.2 percentage points,
whereas the corresponding figure for the human data was
27.8 percentage points. (The RMS difference between
Kuhl & Miller’s animal and human alveolar labeling data
was 10.5 percentage points.) The findings were similar
for the bilabial and velar stimuli.
Figure 7 shows the obtained one-step discrimination
function for the alveolar series and that predicted on the
basis of Equation 1. They are essentially identical, differ-
ingonly because the obtained function was contaminated
by the sampling statistics of the guessing process.
Back-Propagation Network
In light of the foregoing review, there are (at least)
two ways that a model of synthetic CP based on back-
propagation training of a feedforward net can be produced:
(1) As with the BSB model (and paralleling the animal856 DAMPER AND HARNAD
experiments of Kuhl & Miller, 1978), the net is trained on
the 0- and 80-msec endpoints, and generalization is then
tested, using the full range of VOT stimuli; and (2) using
the auto-association paradigm of Harnad et al. (1991,
1995), hidden-unit representations resulting from pre- and
postcategorization training are compared.
In this work, we have adopted the first approach, mostly
because we have both psychophysical and synthetic (BSB
model) data against which to assess our simulation. This
was not the case for Harnad etal.’s (1991, 1995) artificial
data, which accordingly required some other reference for
comparison.
Initially, a separate MLP was constructed for each of
the three (bilabial, alveolar, and velar) series. Each of the
three nets had 192 input units, a number (n) of hidden
units, and a single output unit (with sigmoidal activation
function) to act as a voiced/unvoiced detector. Each net
was trained on 50 repetitions (100 training patterns in
all) of the endpoint stimuli. The number n of hidden
units turned out not to be at all important. In fact, we did
not need hidden units at all. Damper, Gunn, and Gore
(2000) show that synthetic CP of the VOT continuum is
exhibited by single-layer perceptrons, and they exploit
this fact in identifying the neural correlates of CP at the
auditory nerve level. We used n= 2 in the following. Suit-
able training parameters (arrived at by trial and error)
were as follows: learning rate, η = .005; momentum =
.9; weight range = 0.05; error criterion,   = 0.25. The  
error criterion was determined by allowing an average
error of .05 (or .0025 when squared) for each of the 100
training patterns.
Table 1 shows the result of training the bilabial net 10
times from different initial weight settings. As can be
seen, the net trained to the .25 error criterion very easily—
typically, in about 50 epochs. The strong tendency, espe-
cially for those cases in which the criterion was reached
quickly, was to encode the 0-msec endpoint with hidden
unit activations of h1h2 = 01 and the 80-msec endpoint
with h1h2 = 10. (Of course, h1 and h2 were never exactly
0 or 1 but, more typically, something like .05 or .95.) On
only one exceptional occasion (when training required
230 epochs) was a hidden-unit coding arrived at for which
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Figure 5. Categorical perception of voice onset time (VOT) in the
brain-state-in-a-box model. (A)Labeling functions for bilabial, alve-
olar, and velar series. Each point is an average of 50 presentations.
(B) One-step ABX discrimination functions. Each point is an aver-
age of 1,000 presentations.NEURAL MODELS OF CP 857
h1 and h2 for the different endpoints were not both dif-
ferent. Similar results were obtained for the two other
(alveolar and velar) nets, except that the alveolar net was
rather more inclined to discover the h1h2 = 00/11 coding.
Seven weight sets were selected for subsequent testing—
namely, those obtained in fewer than 100 training epochs.
Figure 8A shows typical labeling functions (from the
seven of each) obtained by averaging output activations
over the 50 stimulus presentations at each VOT value for
the three nets. This averaging procedure avoids any ne-
cessity to set arbitrary decision threshold(s) to determine
whether the net’s output is a voiced or an unvoiced label:
We simply interpret the average as the proportion labeled
voiced. The reader might question the validity of the av-
eraging operation, since a real listener would obviously
not have available in auditory memory a statistical sample
of responses from which the average could be computed.
Taking the average, however, is a simple and convenient
procedure that may not be too different from the kind of
similarity measure that could conceivably be computed
from a set of prototypes stored in long-term memory. (In
any event, it parallels what Anderson, Silverstein, et al.,
1977, did in their simulation.) Again, classical CP was ob-
served in all seven cases, with a steep labeling function
and separation of the three curves according to place of
articulation.
The boundary values found by probit analysis (Finney,
1975), averaged across the seven repetitions, were 20.9,
32.8, and 41.6 msec for the bilabial, alveolar, and velar
stimuli, respectively. These are in excellent agreement
with the literature (see Table 2), at least in the case of the
alveolar and velar stimuli. The labeling curve for the bi-
labial series in Figure 8 is not as good as those for the
alveolar and velar stimuli, with the average activation
being rather too low at 20-msec VOT and somewhat too
high for VOTs greater than 30msec. Damper etal. (1990)
deal at some length with a possible reason for this, which
has to do with the details of the synthesis strategy. To use
their description, the bilabial stimuli are pathological. It
is interesting that the BSB model also seems to be sensi-
tive to this pathology, producing too small a VOT value
for the bilabial category boundary (see Figure 8A). The
effect was also found (unpublished results) for a com-
petitive-learning net trained with the Rumelhart and
Zipser (1985) algorithm. The boundary movement with
place of articulation is an emergent property of the nets
(see the detailed comments in the Discussion section
below). There is no sense in which the nets are explicitly
trained to separate the boundaries in this way.
Figure 6B above, shows the typical synthetic identifi-
cation curve of Figure 8A for the alveolar MLP, as com-
pared with the Kuhl and Miller (1978) human and chin-
chilla data. It is apparent that the MLP is a rather better
model of labeling behavior than is the BSB. By probit
analysis, the alveolar boundary was at 32.7 msec (as
compared with 33.3 msec for chinchillas and 35.2 msec
for humans), which was little different from the average
value of 32.8 msec for the seven repetitions. The RMS
difference between the MLP function and the animal data
was 8.1 percentage points, whereas the difference for the
human data is 14.2 percentage points. These figures were
about half those for the BSB model. Again, the findings
were similar for the bilabial and velar stimuli.
Consider now the discrimination functions for the
MLPs. Unlike the Anderson, Silverstein, et al. (1977)
simulation, which produced a discrete code, the MLPs
produce a continuous value in the range (0,1), because of
the sigmoidal activation function. This means that we are
not forced to use covert labeling as a basis for the dis-
crimination. We have simulated a one-step ABX experi-
ment, using the Macmillan et al. (1977) model, in which
there is first a 2IFC subtask to determine the order of the
standards,  AB  or  BA , followed by a yes–no subtask.
The A and B standards were selected at random from ad-
jacent classes—that is, from the sets of 50 responses at
VOT values differing by 10msec. The X focus was chosen
at random, with equal probability of .5, from one of these
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two classes. Output activations were then obtained from
each of the inputs A, B, and X. Because of the perfect
“memory” of the computer simulation, it is possible to
collapse the two subtasks into one. Let the absolute dif-
ference in activation between the X and the A inputs be
|X   A|; similarly, for the B input, the difference is |X  
B|. The classification rule is, then, 
(4)
Finally, this classification is scored as either correct or
incorrect.
We found, however, that |X   A| and |X   B| were oc-
casionally almost indistinguishable in our simulations, in
that they differed only in the fourth or fifth decimal place.
In terms of the Macmillan etal. (1977) model, this means
that a real listener in the 2IFC subtask would probably have
yielded identical (AA or BB) outcomes, which are inap-
propriate for the yes–no subtask. To avoid making the
simulation too sensitive to round-off errors and to simu-
late the nonideality of real listeners, we therefore intro-
duced a guessing threshold, g. According to this, X was
only classified by the rule of Equation 4 above if
If this inequality was not satisfied, the classification of X
was guessed with an equal probability of .5 for each class.
The results were not especially sensitive to the actual value
of g.
Figure8B shows the discrimination functions obtained
from such a simulated ABX experiment. There were 500
 ABA  presentations and 500  ABB  presentations, 1,000
in all. Again taking advantage of a computational short-
cut, there were no presentations of the BA standard, on the
grounds that the simulation had perfect memory, so that
symmetry was ensured and this condition would be prac-
tically indistinguishable from the  AB  standard. (In the
real situation, of course, memory for the standard pre-
sented in the second interval of the  AB  or  BA  dyad
would generally be better than that for the standard in the
first interval.) The guessing threshold, g, was 0.001. There
were clear peaks at the phoneme boundary, and the move-
ment of these peaks with the place of articulation was
qualitatively correct. Paralleling the less steep (and more
psychophysically reasonable) labeling functions, the dis-
crimination peaks were not as sharp as those for the BSB
model. They were closer to those typically obtained from
real listeners.
Figure9 shows the discrimination curve obtained from
the simulation described above (for the alveolar series)
and that predicted from labeling, using the Haskins for-
mula. Similar results were obtained for the other VOT
series. The back-propagation model (unlike the BSB
model) convincingly reproduces the important effect
|| || . XA XB −−−> g
X is 
A if X A X B
B otherwise.
−<− 



Table 1
Results of Training the 192–2–1 Bilabial Multilayer
Perceptron to an Error Criterion of   = .25,
Starting From 10 Different Initial Weight Settings
h1h2 Coding Both
Iterations 0 msec 80 msec Different
48 01 10 Y
49 01 10 Y
51 01 10 Y
51 10 01 Y
54 01 10 Y
56 01 10 Y
56 10 01 Y
107 00 11 Y
125 11 00 Y
230 01 00 N
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Figure 7. Categorical perception of voice onset time (VOT) in the
brain-state-in-a-box model: Obtained ABX discrimination function
for the alveolar series and that predicted on the basis of the corre-
sponding labeling function, using the Haskins formula. The close cor-
respondence reflects the fact that the neural model converts the input
to a discrete label, so that its discrimination function is a direct imple-
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whereby observed discrimination in psychophysical tests
exceeds that predicted from Equation 1. This can be in-
terpreted as evidence for the importance of continuous
representation(s) in CP.
We have so far been unable to train a singlenet to label
these data properly. Although a 192–2–1 net trains easily
on all six endpoint stimuli, it will not generalize in such
a way as to put the boundary in the correct location for each
of the three series of inputs. We are conducting studies to
see whether this problem can be overcome by using more
hidden units and/or a different output coding.
Figure10 shows the standard deviation of the activation
versus VOT. As one would expect, this tends to peak at
the category boundary (although this is clearer, in this
particular figure, for the alveolar and velar series than
for the bilabial stimuli), which is consistent with our re-
marks above about this series being pathological. Indeed,
the standard deviation could be taken as a credible predic-
tor of reaction time in human psychophysical experiments.
SYNTHETIC CATEGORICAL PERCEPTION
AND SIGNAL DETECTION THEORY
In view of the importance of Macmillan et al.’s (1977)
contribution to the field, it seems clear that synthetic CP
should be assessed by using the techniques they have pi-
oneered. Yet, apart from the work of Eijkman (1992), we
know of no other suggestion in the literature to the effect
that the methods of psychophysics in general, and of sig-
nal detection analysis in particular, are relevant to the
evaluation of neural net models. (Even then, Eijkman
does little more than advance d′ as a useful measure of
separation in a pattern-recognition context: His main con-
cern is with his “black box image” technique for visual-
izing the internal structure of a net.) In this section, we
consider the relation between labeling/identification and
discrimination from the perspective of SDT.
In the standard yes–no detection task, hits are yes re-
sponses to signal presentations, and false alarms are yes
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Figure 8. Categorical perception of voice onset time (VOT) by multi-
layer perceptrons with two hidden units. (A)Labeling functions in terms
of average activation. Each function (bilabial, alveolar, and velar series)
is obtained from a different net, and each point is an average of 50 pre-
sentations. (B)Discrimination functions from a simulated one-step ABX
task. Each point is an average of 1,000 presentations: 500 of  ABA  and
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responses to signal-plus-noise presentations. In the ABX
discrimination paradigm, it is arbitrary whether  ABA and
 BAB  are taken to correspond to signal presentations
and  ABB  and  BAA  are taken to correspond to signal-
plus-noise or vice versa. We adopt the former convention,
as in Table 3, where Response 1 means that the subject
nominated the first interval as containing the standard cor-
responding to X and Response 2 means that the second
interval was nominated. In the simulations described in
the previous section, the perfect memory of the computer
simulations means that the order of the A and B standards
was irrelevant. Hence, as was previously stated, only the
stimulus–response matrix in the top half of the table was
collected.
Macmillan et al. (1977) consider the unbiased case of
ABX discrimination. This, they say, is “the only one for
which a simple expression can be written for the hit and
false alarm rates” (p.459) in the form of their Equation3:
H = P(Response 1| ABA )=   P(Response 1| BAB )
= 1   FA.
A d′ -like sensitivity measure can now be obtained as 
d′s = z(H)   z(FA)
= z(H)   z(1   H)
= 2z(H), (5)
from the hit rate alone. True d′ can then be found from
this d′s, using Table 3 of Kaplan, Macmillan, and Creel-
man (1978). In the terms of Macmillan et al. (1977), CP
requires that this true d′ for discrimination shall be equiv-
alent to an identification distance, or identification d′ ,
obtained by the Braida and Durlach (1972) procedure. This
involves subtracting the z-transformed probabilities of as-
signing presentations to the same category.
In the following, we analyze only the back-propagation
neural model of VOT perception. We exclude the BSB
model from consideration for two reasons. First, accord-
ing to the results of the previous section, it produces a less
convincing simulation of the psychophysical data. (Re-
call, also, that it was necessary to orthogonalize the input
data for the BSB model, but not for the back-propagation
model.) Second, it is inherently unsuitable for the analy-
sis, because its labeling function includes many 1 and 0
points, which are not amenable to transformation to z-
scores, since they yield values of  ∞ .
Table 4 shows the (one-step) discrimination d′ , found
by using Equation 5 and Table 3 of Kaplan et al. (1978),
and the identification d′ obtained from the z-transformed
identification proportions for the representative case of
the alveolar series. In Figure11, discrimination d′ is plot-
ted against identification d′ . According to the Macmillan
et al. (1977) characterization of CP, these two measures
should be equivalent. That is, the points of Figure 11
should be distributed about the unity-slope straight line.
Clearly, discrimination d′ exceeds identification d′ , as is so
often found: The slope of the best-fit line is actually 1.899
(unaffected by forcing the regression through the origin).
However, on the basis of a paired t test (t = 1.2926 with
v = 7 degrees of freedom, two-tailed test), we reject the
hypothesis that these two sensitivity measures are equiv-
alent (p   .2). Similar findings hold for the bilabial and
velar series. As in other studies, the two measures are
highly correlated. Regression analysis (alveolar series)
yields r = .8740 for the case in which (on the basis of as-
sumed equality) the best-fit line is forced to pass through
the origin, andr= .8747 when it is not ( p .1). Hence, we
conclude that discrimination performance is correlated
with but somewhat higher than identification performance,
as in the case of human observers (e.g., Macmillan, 1987,
p. 59).
DISCUSSION: IMPLICATIONS OF
SYNTHETIC CATEGORICAL PERCEPTION
Thus far, we have emphasized CP as an emergent
property of learning systems in general, arguing that it is
not a special mode of perception. In this section, we aim
to make these claims more concrete. If CP is indeed an
emergent and general property of learning systems, one
might ask, Why are strong CP effects not always found
(e.g., in vowel discrimination or long-range intensity
judgments)? Rather, degree of CP is observed to vary with
the nature of the stimuli, the psychophysical procedure,
the experience of the subjects, and so on. To answer this
key question, we draw a sharp distinction between the two
essentially different kinds of synthetic CP that have been
explored in this paper.
Consider first the work using artificial or novel stimuli,
such as that of Anderson, Silverstein, etal. (1977), Harnad
et al. (1991, 1995), and Goldstone et al. (1996). In these
cases, the category boundary is placed either (1)at a point
Table 2
Summary Phonetic Boundary Data for Humans, Chinchillas,
and the Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) Neural Model
Boundary Bilabial Alveolar Velar
Values (msec) (msec) (msec)
Human
Pooled 26.8 35.2 42.3
Range 21.3–29.5 29.9–42.0 37.2–47.5
Chinchilla
Pooled 23.3 33.3 42.5
Range 21.3–24.5 26.7–36.0 41.0–43.7
MLP
Averaged 20.9 32.8 41.6
Range 18.6–23.4 30.7–35.1 39.8–45.0
Note—Human and chinchilla data are from Kuhl and Miller (1978),
and pooled means that the identification data were aggregated before
fitting a sigmoid and taking its 50% voice onset time (VOT) value.
There were 4 human listeners and 4 chinchillas, except for the bilabial
and velar conditions, in which only two chinchillas participated. Fig-
ures for the MLP are for seven repetitions of training, starting from dif-
ferent random initial weight sets, and averagedmeans that the 50% VOT
boundary values were obtained individually and then averaged.NEURAL MODELS OF CP 861
predetermined by the labels supplied during (supervised)
training, if training was on the complete continuum, or
(2) at the center of the continuum, if training was on the
endpoints of the continuum only. This corresponds to the
situation in which real subjects would not already pos-
sess internal labels, anchors, or prototypes and so would
only display CP as a result of training and experience.
Hence, this type of synthetic CP can only be a reasonable
model of learned categorization—such as that found in the
categorization training experiments of Goldstone et al.,
as well as those of Goldstone (1994), Beale and Keil
(1995), Pevtzow and Harnad (1997), Livingstone, An-
drews,and Harnad (1998), Goldstone (1998), and Steve-
nage (1998)—rather than of innate categorization. By con-
trast, in the work on stop consonants, the nets are trained
on endpoint stimuli from a VOT continuum, and gener-
alization of the learning to intermediate stimuli is tested.
In this case, the synthetic listener places the category
boundaries of the three (bilabial, alveolar, and velar) se-
ries in a way that predicts the psychophysical results
from real listeners.
A very revealing finding in this regard is that the BSB
simulation categorizes the artificial (vectors) continuum
and the VOT stimuli very differently, even though train-
ing is on endpoints in both cases. Figure 3B shows that
the category boundary is precisely at midrange, between
Stimuli 7 and 8. This is hardly surprising: It is difficult
to see what else the net might do to dichotomize the data,
other than bisect the continuum at its midpoint. On the
other hand, Figure 5A shows that the BSB nets position
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Figure9. Categorical perception of voice onset time (VOT) by a mul-
tilayer perception with two hidden units: the one-step ABX discrimi-
nation function obtained for the alveolar series and that predicted on
the basis of the corresponding labeling function, using the Haskins for-
mula. Here, the obtained discrimination is better than that predicted
(as can be seen in the psychophysical results), reflecting the fact that
the output of the neural model is continuous, rather than discrete.
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
VOT (ms)
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
a
c
t
i
v
a
t
i
o
n
0 1 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 0
bilabial
alveolar
velar
Figure10. Standard deviation of the multilayer perceptron’s output
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their phonetic boundaries in such a way as to segregate
the VOT series by place of articulation in the same way
human and animal listeners do. This striking difference in
network behavior can only be explained credibly by the
different input continua: It is unlikely that it could have
arisen through essentially trivial differences in parameters,
such as the different numbers of inputs in the two cases (16
as opposed to 20). Thus, we infer that there is some prop-
erty of the input continua in the simulation of VOT per-
ception that is not shared by the much simpler artificial/
vectors continuum. Hence, we do not expect to observe
strong CP effects in all cases of generalization testing but
only when the stimulus continuum (appropriately encoded
for presentation to the net) has some special properties.
That is, the potential for categorization must be somehow
implicit in the physical stimulus continuum and its en-
coding schema. Because they are embodied in software,
connectionist models can be systematically manipulated
to discover their operational principles. Thus, means are
available to discover just what these special properties
might be. Damper et al. (2000) show that each of the
three (bilabial, alveolar, and velar) nets has its strongest
connections to different areas of the neurogram and that
these differences predict the shift of boundary with place
of articulation. We infer that what is supposed to be a con-
tinuum actually is not. There are discontinuities (system-
atically dependent on place of articulation) in the Abram-
son and Lisker (1970) stimuli themselves, and this is the
sense in which the potential for categorization exists. In
other words, what is supposed to be a unidimensional con-
tinuum (so that only VOT and features perfectly correlated
with it vary) is actually multidimensional.
Of course, in the case of the VOT stimuli, the inputs
to the BSB net have been subjected to sophisticated pre-
processing by the auditory model of Pont and Damper
(1991). The role this (simulated) auditory processing plays
in the observed categorization behavior is currently being
investigated. Early indications (Damper, 1998) are that
the auditory preprocessing is vital to realistic simulation
of VOT perception in that “the front-end processor is not
essential to category formation but plays an important
part in the boundary-movement phenomenon, by empha-
sizing . . . parts of the time–frequency regions of the
speech signal” (p. 2196).
We are now in a position to refine our notion of emer-
gentfunctionality. The concept of emergence has grown in
popularity in cognitive science and neural computing in
recent years and is starting to influence models of speech
categorization (e.g., Guenter & Gjaja, 1996; Lacerda,
1998). The term does not easily admit of a precise defin-
ition (see, e.g., Holland, 1998, p. 3), but Steels (1991)
writes: “Emergent functionality means that a function is
not achieved directly by a component or a hierarchical
system of components, but indirectly by the interaction of
more primitive components among themselves and with
the world” (p. 451, italics added). This seems to capture
rather well what is going on here: The primitive compo-
nents are the units of the neural net(s) that interact with
“the world” in the form of external stimuli, with sensory
transduction and/or early perceptual processing mediat-
ing between them. The interaction “with the world” is par-
ticularly important. The potential for categorization must
exist implicitly in the sensory continuum. So, in what sense
is CP not special? From the work described in this paper,
it is apparent that we do not need specialized processing
apparatus, as is posited in motor theory. Rather, provided
the sensory continua are of the right form, any general
learning system operating on broadly neural principles
ought to exhibit the essentials of CP.
Finally, we note that the TRACE model apparently acts
like the BSB model, simply placing the phonetic bound-
ary between / / and /k/ at midrange. This could be either
because the stylized inputs to the net (interpolated VOT
and F1 onset frequency) are not good counterparts to the
Table 4
Signal Detection Theory Analysis of Synthetic Categorical
Perception by the Back-Propagation Neural Model: Alveolar Series
VOT Identification Discrimination
(msec) Proportion z(ident) Identification d′ Hit Rate (H) d′ s = 2z(H) Discrimination d ′
0 0.955 – – – – –
10 0.955 1.6950 0.0095 0.4840  0.0803  0.3800
20 0.941 1.6855 1.7046 0.8280 1.8926 2.2426
30 0.424  0.0191 1.4567 0.9720 3.8220 3.9120
40 0.070  1.4758 0.1593 0.5260 0.1305 0.4810
50 0.051  1.6351 0.0 0.4220  0.3936  0.8736
60 0.051  1.6351 0.0 0.4500  0.2513 0.6826
70 0.051  1.6351 0.0 0.5180 0.0903 0.4006
80 0.051  1.6351 0.0 0.5040 0.0201 0.1904
Note—VOT, voice onset time.
Table 3
Stimulus–Response Matrix for the
ABX Discrimination Paradigm
Presentation Response 1 Response 2
 ABA  hit miss
 ABB  false alarm correct rejection
 BAA  false alarm correct rejection
 BAB  hit missNEURAL MODELS OF CP 863
Abramson and Lisker (1970) stimuli or, more likely, be-
cause there has been no (simulated) auditory preprocess-
ing of these patterns. Further work is necessary to dis-
tinguish between these two possibilities.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Neural nets provide an underexplored yet revealing
way of studying CP. We have shown that a variety of
neural models is capable of replicating classical CP, with
the point of maximal ambiguity of the steep labeling
function and a sharp peak of the discrimination function
coinciding at the category boundary. Given the ubiquitous
way that CP arises in network performance, we believe
that the effect is very basic to how such nets (and other
adaptive systems, such as human and animal subjects)
learn. Focusing on the special case of speech CP with ini-
tial stop consonants, we have also demonstrated the shift
of phoneme boundary with place of articulation for the
voicing continuum by using two different nets—the his-
torically important BSB model of Anderson, Silverstein,
et al. (1977) and a more recent MLP (back-propagation)
model. The most convincing demonstration of synthetic
CP to date is that by the MLP model. The categorization
behavior is an emergent property of the simulations: There
is no sense in which it is programmed into the model or
results from parameter adjustment in a curve-fitting sense.
The back-propagation net also replicates the frequently
documented effect whereby observed discrimination
performance exceeds that predicted from labeling on the
assumption that only discrete information about the labels
is available (the so-called Haskins model). It does so by
retaining continuous information after the stage of sen-
sory processing. That is, the categorization occurs at the
later, decision stage.
Early studies of CP considered the effect in terms of
low-threshold theories, which assume a mapping of sen-
sory stimuli to discrete internal states. In 1977, Macmil-
lan et al. made an important advance by applying to CP
the more modern methods of SDT, which assume a con-
tinuous internal representation. They suggested that CP
should be characterized by the equivalence of identifica-
tion and discrimination sensitivity, both measured with
d′ . Our back-propagation simulations fail to satisfy this
definition, in that identification d′ is statistically different
from discrimination d′ , although the two are correlated.
The Macmillan etal. (1977) paper is now 20 years old.
So, despite its pioneering nature, it is obviously not the
last word on CP. Indeed, since 1977, Macmillan has re-
treated somewhat from the position that equivalence of
discrimination and identification should be taken to be the
defining characteristic of CP (see Macmillan, Goldberg,
& Braida, 1988). In 1987, he writes: “it is clear that few if
any dimensions have this property” (p.78). Nonetheless,
“relations between tasks can provide useful information
about the manner in which stimuli are processed, how-
ever such processing is named.” In the present work, we
have shown that the relation between identification and
discrimination performance for a simple neural net sim-
ulation of VOT perception closely parallels that seen for
real subjects. Since the simulation is faithful in other re-
spects too, it can (and should) be taken seriously as a model
of CP. Because of the simplicity of the model and the
way that category boundary phenomena arise quite natu-
rally during learning, we conclude that CP is not a special
mode of perception. Rather, it is an emergent property of
learning systems in general and of their interaction with
the stimulus continuum,11mediated by sensory transduc-
tion and/or early perceptual processing.
The assumptions underlying our models are similar to
those of Nearey (1997, note 1), who presupposes, as do
we, “the segmentation of the input signals . . . before they
are presented to a perceptual model.” In addition, because
of their inability to handle temporal sequences of inputs,
Figure 11. Discrimination d′ versus identification d′ for the back-
propagation neural model and the alveolar voice onset time series.
Categorical perception according to Macmillan, Kaplan, and Creel-
man (1977) requires that these two sensitivity measures are equivalent
(i.e., in the ideal case, all the points should lie on the unity-slope line).
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the models are assumed to have perfect memory (see Port,
1990, for criticisms of improper treatment of time in con-
nectionist models). In the case of VOT perception, there-
duced (192-value) neural spectrogram is available as a
(conveniently presegmented) static input to the back-
propagation net. Apart from an implicit time as space
representation, there is no explicit representation of rela-
tional time. Precise time representation seems unneces-
sary for the credible modeling of VOT perception, since
the spike-counting procedure (which reduces the neuro-
gram to a 192-component vector for presentation to the
MLP) effectively obscures this. The BSB model was un-
able to distinguish the voicing contrast in the complete
192-value patterns and was, therefore, given 20 selected
input values only, again as a static pattern.
Real listeners obviously hear a sequence of sounds
during speech communication, and memory effects are a
very important component of perception. Hence, a prior-
ityfor future work is the addition of recurrent (feedback,
as opposed to purely feedforward) connections to the more
realistic perceptron model, in the manner of Jordan (1986)
or Elman (1990), so as to implement an imperfect mem-
ory buffer. Future studies should also address the synthetic
categorization of vowel continua and the precise role of
preprocessing by the (simulated) auditory periphery.
Much could also be learned from studying a real (rather
than synthesized) stop consonant continuum, provided
sufficient productions could be gathered from the ambigu-
ous region around the phonetic boundary.
Finally, an important question concerns the role of the
auditory model vis á vis the input stimuli. What would hap-
pen if we were to apply our analyses directly to the input
patterns without the (rather complex) auditory model’s
intervening? It is difficult to do this, because there is only
a single synthetic token for each acoustic stimulus. (This
is unavoidable, since we are no longer simulating the sto-
chastic process of mechanical-to-neural transduction by
the cochlear hair cells.) Hence, there is an extreme paucity
of data on which to train the neural network model(s). In
an attempt to answer this question indirectly, Damper etal.
(2000) replaced the auditory front end with a short-time
Fourier analysis and then used a support vector machine
to model labeling behavior. This kind of learning ma-
chine makes best use of sparse training data. It was found
that correct movement of the boundary with place of ar-
ticulation was abolished, indicating that some aspect or
aspects of peripheral auditory function are essential to
correct simulation of categorization behavior. To confirm
that this was not an artifact of having only a single train-
ing token per class, perceptrons were trained on single,
averaged neurograms, whereupon appropriate catego-
rization behavior was maintained (Damper, 1998), indi-
cating that information about the statistical distribution
of training data is not essential to the simulation and that
the extreme sparsity of the training data need not be fatal.
In future work, we intend to confirm these preliminary
findings in two ways. First, we will use a database of real
speech, so that multiple training tokens whose statistics
reflect natural variability in production will be available
for training. Second, we will employ a variety of simpli-
fied front-end analyses to determine those aspects of the
peripheral auditory transformation that are essential to
simulating boundary movement with place of articulation.
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NOTES
1. In identification, subjects are required to learn (or supply already
learned) unique labels to stimuli. In discrimination, subjects must (learn
to) distinguish between classes of stimuli. Usually, single stimuli are pre-
sented in identification, and multiple stimuli in discrimination, but see
the recent work of Lotto, Kluender, and Holt (1998), in which “experi-
mental design and stimulus presentation are exactly the same; only the
response labels differ’’ (p. 3649).
2. Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1988) credit James A. Anderson, together with
Stephen Grossberg and Tuevo Kohonen, with keeping neural net model-
ing in artificial intelligence and cognitive science alive “during the dark
ages’’ (their note8), during which it was generally considered to have been
superseded by the physical-symbol system hypothesis of intelligence.
3. As was pointed out to us by Michael Studdert-Kennedy (personal
communication, August 7, 1997), the concept of VOT was not formulated
until 1964 by Lisker and Abramson. In the 1958 Liberman et al. paper,
F1-cutback was viewed as a purely acoustic variable: Its origin in VOT
was not understood at that time. VOT was originally defined as an ar-
ticulatory variable—the interval between stop release and the onset of
voicing—having multiple acoustic consequences, including the presence/
absence of prevoicing, variations in release-burst energy, aspiration du-
ration, and F1 onset frequency. In this sense, VOT includes F1 onset fre-
quency: The two are (supposedly) perfectly correlated.
4. However, the magnitude of context effects varies greatly with the na-
ture of the stimuli and tends to be negatively correlated with the degree
of CP, as was discussed by Repp (1984). Also, the “unresolved diffi-
culty’’ referred to above arises in part, if not entirely, from the different
contexts of the stimuli in typical identification and discrimination tasks
(Lotto et al.,1998; Repp, Healy, & Crowder, 1979), at least in the case of
vowels.
5. In threshold theories (Luce,1963; Macmillan & Creelman, 1991),
a physical continuum is assumed to map to discrete perceptual states,
rather than into a perceptual continuum. The threshold is the division
between the internal states. In high-threshold theory, the thresholds
themselves set the limits to detection, and errors on noisetrials arise only
from guessing. In low-threshold theory, the limit on performance is set by
a factor other than the threshold, such as noise (Pastore, 1987a, p. 36).
6. We use angled braces (  ) to denote an actual presentation dyad or
triad (for which X cannot be ambiguous), in contrast to ABX, which is
the name of the paradigm.
7. We use the terms neuron and unit interchangeably.
8. Here, the term auto-associative refers to multilayer feedforward
nets with hidden units trained to reproduce their inputs as outputs. This
is distinct from auto-associative feedback nets like the BSB model, in
which there are no hidden units and the input and output units are phys-
ically identical.
9. The reader might object that lines of differing length are not per-
ceived categorically by humans and, so, a network simulation should not
show CP either. This is the point of varying the iconicity of the codings:
to find the ones that make sense. Literally giving both human observers
and networks 12 lines to identify/discriminate will not produce an
equivalent task: The coding needs to be varied, to achieve the equivalence.
10. We prefer to reserve the term attractor to describe a stable state of
a dynamical system. As such, it cannot strictly describe the sort of static
input–output relation that Goldstone et al. (1996) clearly have in mind.
11. According to Harnad (1982), “experiential inputs [can] vary con-
tinuously along several sensory dimensions, rather than falling neatly
into certain prefabricated physical or perceptual categories. . . . [They
can be] multidimensional and polysensory . . . such as complex geomet-
ric forms, acoustic timbres and sound sequences, complex daily events
and sequences of experiences—in fact, any experience that varies along
an actual continuum (or a ‘virtual’ continuum, in virtue of unresolvable
information complexity). And this is not yet to have mentioned purely
abstract cases, such as the ‘space’ from which . . . the foregoing list of
examples [were extracted].”
(Manuscript received June 6, 1997;
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